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Interview
Friday, 1500 hours, 30 March 1990, by telephone

Major Norwood Jackson
Department of Corrections (Admin)
Commissioner Norwood E. Jackson
APO 389
Valhalla, New York 10595
155 Ferris Avenue, Apartment 2D
White Plains, New York 10603
Telephone# = 914-347-6020
I'm Commissioner of Corrections for Westchester County, NY.
I was an MP
officer; a black officer.
I got to the stockade 4 July 1967 and left
about the fourth of July in 1968. The riot occurred a month after I
left.
It was very devastating.
I had been asked to stay on but I said
I have a family too.
So I rotated. They put Vern Johnson in after I
warned that he was not the guy to put in there.
He was a very learned
person but no common sense.
Little things. We had a sign there which
read 'Firm but Fair.'
To make an impact, he changed it to 'Firm and
Fair.'
Then he began to allow inmates to go around the staff.
He began
to think he could handle anything and didn't allow people to use the
authority they had.
I've always felt that inmates should go through
channels.
He was the kind of guy who, in the face of the staff, would
take an inmates word for something. That's hard on discipline.
From
day one he liked to impress with his knowledge but he had a problem
dealing with people face-to-face.
I had a very sharp face-off with him.
He felt he knew it all.
I feel in talking with a couple of guys after I
left that they lost all control because the inmates bypassed them.
Johnson tried to do it himself to the extent that he would chastize,
countermand orders, and take the word of inmates over staff. He
chastised staff in front of inmates.
Exactly what I heard happened.
That was the second riot because I put down one myself.
I was away one
time on R&R and I returned to find the inmates basically in control of
the jail. That was around March or April of 1968.
Inmates were allowed
to do certain things without going through channels. They got away with
things when I was gone that would not have happened had I been there.
People started to change procedures and the inmates got the upper hand.
I was the second in command.
I ran it but the guy who was supposed to
be in charge of it was named LTC George Derringer.
Everybody charges me
with running it, but he was in command.
I was his assistant until he
left and then I took over, and Johnson came in to relieve me.
I left in
July 1968 and Derringer left a little before me.
I started out running
it by myself and then Derringer came in and then he departed and then I
left.
He was the confinement officer but the operational issues were
handled by me primarily because I was the executive officer.
In fact I
was in control of handling the men so I controlled all the operational
work. What did Derringer do? Well, he carried the title.
He was
appointed confinement officer.
It was one of those things. When I came
in country I was scheduled to be the executive officer for the 93d MP BN
at Qui Nhon.
I had run jails and stockades for most of my career.
But

I ended up running the stockade at Long Binh. My idea was to keep it
simple and to deal with people honestly and firmly.
Most of the kids in there were scared and in there for every kind of
crime you can think of.
Scared kids in a war zone are tough to work
with. They reacted to pressures in a negative way. We did get them to
work feverishly when they thought they were doing something that
contributed to the mission. We developed a work program there. We had
an area we called Big Red. We used to break up laterite--a hard red
clay--there and use it to fill sandbags. We started out working them in
this yard as a punishment and it rolled over to be a positive
contribution to the war effort. We filled sandbags and flew them to the
Delta and throughout the war zone as a contribution and these guys would
get in that yard and work like trojans just to get that mission
accomplished.
The heat problem was bad, so I used to give them a
quota--fill so-many bags and we'll knock off for the day.
I put up a
sign:
You're Now Entering Big Red. When we got that program structured
so they knew what they had to do, there was no problem getting them to
work and they worked hard getting that job accomplished.
They learned to clean, and to keep themselves clean, to fall out in
uniform like they was a regular outfit.
I saw kids come in there from
Americal Division and sometimes 25th DIV, after having been in the
field.
Many complained about being on the point.
They'd come out of
the field and go to one of these whorehouses. Next thing they knew they
was arrested by the MPs. Nobody backed them. And so we had to try to
restore some self-respect in them; that they do make a contribution and
not that they're there to be screwed. We communicated better in there
than they did in the outfits.
There's a level of respect due everybody.
Some guards couldn't take
what they dished out.
I don't mean for the guards to be pussies, but to
be firm but fair.
Those who did their job objectively contributed to
the whole program, but those who felt they were Jesus Christ after they
put on that badge, I couldn't tolerate that and got rid of them.
I'm a
hands-on operator; I'm not in the office, but out there looking at them.
I got to know inmates well.
When I accepted the job they gave me a pretty free hand in getting some
staff together.
I got together some guys I knew; some were up in the
combat zone; those I had known, who I had played football with; some
SGTs through LTs I knew. About a third of my staff were 95-C
(confinement specialists).
It improved as we went along.
Initially
most were just MP 95-Bravos. We didn't even have an abundance of those
available, so used soldiers from nearby companies whose names came up on
duty rosters. We had to do our own training of 11-Bushes. Once we gave
them some on-hands, on the job training, they did pretty well, as long
as the structure was there and we did the job of close supervision. We
taught them how to deal with men; how to respect men regardless of who
they were. We pretty much ran a straightforward, honest program. We
didn't allow people to abuse people, but we dealt with them in a pretty
stern way.

I had a trustee policy.
It worked very well.
I identified jobs for
trustees to do in ways that didn't conflict with dealing with other
inmates. Otherwise they're viewed as finks or rats. We identified guys
with some skills who wanted to work and those who didn't.
Some did not
want to work. We housed them together, fed them together, and they were
confined to a particular area.
Housing had to be clean, rules followed,
or everybody got punished. We had trustees who ran the kitchen, who did
the work around the kitchen; those who had specific jobs in Big Red;
those who could do mechanical work--we used them in that way. Before
long I had a working force that begged to work.
Parolees could go outside the wire and work in areas where the troops
lived.
They did cleaning in company areas instead of the guys working
on the line. Worked in the orderly room or in the motor pool. They
began to feel responsible for something and we had no problem with that
program.
There were a lot of substance abusers there. When people are scared
they use substances more readily.
They'd come in there. We had no way
of stopping it. That was the first time we used social workers in the
stockade. We patrolled the area pretty heavily. We put in a
double-apron fence with 12-14' space between them; 7' fence with razor
ribbon, so nobody was going to penetrate that.
If you get hung up on
it, it'll make a soprano of you.
There might have been instances when
somebody rode by on a jeep and threw a packet over the fence, but we had
towers and we could pretty much see and control.
Inmates were housed in
such a way that nobody had direct access to them.
We did what was necessary and authorized at LBJ in terms of lock-ins.
When a guy acted up, he needed to be punished.
I started the conex
boxes; took a welding torch and cut slats in them. We didn't have areas
for special treatment. We built everything from the ground up. We were
living in GP (M) tents [15' X 30' J. When guys couldn't adjust, we put
them in these conex containers.
It didn't take long in there when it
was 110° in the shade. We didn't have standard cell-blocks. We
finally built some but didn't have them initially. The conex containers
became a handy tool when they were available.
It didn't take a lot of
time in one to get religion.
That was kind of a medieval use of those
conexes. They were metal boxes and that sun on a hot tin roof helped
people get the message pretty quick.
The boxes established a stigma; it
was a degrading experience whether they were comfortable or not.
They
became a symbol of something that probably did not exist as severely as
people thought.
Initially, though, when they sat in the sun they were
cruel containers.
It was a way to house people separately so they
didn't contribute to discipline problems.
It helped you to control it.
I found that the best way to deal with men who were in a war zone and
generally scared in many cases--it was easy for them to follow someone
who was very vocal--when you addressed the issues of sanitation or
medicine in a genuine way and actually deal with inmates in a credible,
realistic way, you can control any number.
That was true in a war zone.

We don't feed them one thing and the staff another. Make it a point to
feed your people where they can see the food is the same. Make it a
point also that when you give out discipline, give it out for a reason
to someone who genuinely needs to be disciplined.
Do that in a uniform
way.
That worked for me. No matter how serious it is, once you
establish your credibility--and be truthful about it--don't be devious,
one way sometimes and another way next time--set a uniform standard of
treatment for everybody as well as uniform discipline treatment.
They
saw we generally attended to their needs--hygiene, food and clothing,
then there's no reason for them to fight you. You know, we don't
solicit business!
LReading from inmate inter.view:
a black, a mathematical genius.

The guy in charge there was a huge guy,
Do you like math?]

Well, I've had to deal with it.
[Very bright.

A huge guy.

I'm about 6' and weigh 300#.

Are you tall?J
Then I weighed 260-265.

[While I was there, the guards were beating on us at all times very,
very severe.
Does that ring any bells?]
No.
[Did the guards sometimes get out of hand with their treatment?]
Never.

Never.

[Then there was another huge guy, also black, a captain.]
Ernie Talps.
He was killed at Ft. Riley when he stopped on the road to
help a disabled car.
Bob Mcclendon was a captain when I was there.
He's in Washington, DC at
Howard University Hospital running the security program there.
His
number is 202-865-6950 or 865-1103.
Sam Lewis was operations officer for 18th MP BDE. He's Director of
Department of Corrections for Arizona.
602-262-8465/262-8011 (Phoenix).
General Eugene Chromarty, who at the time was XO for the 95th MP BN may
have something to tell you.
He's now a MG in charge ot criminal
investigations for DOD. HP = 703-780-8318; BP = 202-756-2263.

Telephone call from Maj Jackson, superintendent of the NY prison,
regarding my sending him the interview where the guy claimed there was a
major riot prior to the August 1968 one:
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J:
I got back from being away and was going through my mail and found
this letter you sent in reference to the riots that took place.
I'm
reading through this thing.
It's foreign to me about a few thousand
inmates who rioted.
C:

Isn't that amazing?

J:
That fellow!
I don't know who this guy is.
I don't think in my
entire tenure we had more than, max, 7/800 people.
C:
I thought that was the wildest story, but I can't afford just to
decide on my own that this is wild.
I thought I would send it to
somebody who would know.
J: Well, if he claims he saw a riot in the Spring of '67, they didn't
riot until July.
C:

exactly.

J: Mmmhmm. And I'm not aware of any of that. And when they had the
situation later in the year--I don't know where he got his information.
C: Well, it's kind of hard to tell about some of these guys.
to tell me war stories.
J:

They like

They have a hard time deciding what is real and what isn't.

C:
I'm glad you called because I've had another problem arise since I
wrote you that letter.
Did you ever use prisoner chasers? I had a guy
who claimed to have been trained as a sniper and who was called on by
officials at LBJ when a prisoner actually escaped.
He was sent after
them on about six different occasions.
J:
Absolutely not. Absolutely not. We were dealing with American
prisoners. There was never anything such as that.
C:

Thanks for helping.

J:

If I can help you.

I may get in touch again.
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